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• Bank-centric financial systems are not inherently safer than
systems that include meaningful roles for securities and capital
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vings and lending instruments available (and thus probably types of
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the activities of financial intermediaries, not on compressing inte-
rest rates for domestic savers. Cross-border lending should primarily
involve creation of multinational banks’ subsidiaries in the local eco-
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are more effective in less open or less financially deep economies
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Developing Asia faces a much greater intellectual and policy challenge on the financial side of the 
economy than on the real side (ie the side concerned with producing goods and services). There is pretty 
clear consensus and even a roadmap for the trade and investment side of the spectacular East Asian 
development stories over the last 60 years. These were largely based on integration with global markets 
and value chains under rules that have been framed mostly by the United States and Western Europe. In 
the financial area, however, there is no such clear consensus. 
 
A number of Asian countries, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, succeeded while 
pursuing a different path than the United States and United Kingdom on the treatment of household savings 
and maintaining limits on financial development. The excesses of Anglo-American financial liberalisation 
being the apparent cause of the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008-11 only deepened their caution. 
Major failures in risk management were identified in the rich Western countries, in both the public and 
private sectors. The understanding of financial linkages and of the system as a whole by relevant public 
authorities was inadequate (Gorton 2009), as was their prudential supervision of many individual financial 
firms. Financial innovation was associated with opacity, instability, and a potentially nefarious “shadow 
banking system” (Pozsar et al, 2010). These failures were an echo of those that caused the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–98, though in both crises the message was exaggerated and oversimplified (Rhee and 
Posen 2013). 
 
Yet, a number of Asian countries have wanted to create internationally competitive financial centres within 
their borders, which also require high levels of liberalisation and financial innovation. Key elements of this 
effort included the development of market-based finance in the form of tradable equities, bonds, and even 
instruments of risk transfer such as derivatives and securitisation; a deepening of international financial 
integration, associated with the elimination of cross-border capital controls and the adoption of common 
financial standards; and the creation of strong, competent, and independent institutions for financial 
sector oversight, within existing central banks or as autonomous agencies. Furthermore, the recent crisis 
notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence that financial repression imposes direct costs, if not 
outright limits, on broader economic development (Cline, 2010), and, as demonstrated by the summer 
2015 equity market developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), can itself contribute to financial 
instability1. 
 
Simultaneously, the elevation of the Group of Twenty (G-20) to its new status as “premier forum for 
international economic cooperation” among its member constituencies2, with an initial strong emphasis 
on financial regulatory matters (Rottier and Véron, 2010), was intended to send a message that a new 
                                                          
1 Mikitani and Posen (2001) sets out how financial repression and partial protection of certain banking sectors in 
the United States and Japan led to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and the Japanese banking crisis of the 
1990s, respectively. 
2 Group of Twenty, Pittsburgh Summit Declaration, September 2009. 
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policy consensus was being defined. This new policy consensus, like the G-20 itself, was supposed to 
involve developing and emerging-market economies on an equal footing with advanced ones. The G-20 
reform program has recorded a few successes, notably the rapid finalisation of the Basel III accord on 
capital, leverage, and liquidity for traditional banks, whose key elements were agreed by the end of 2010. 
The message, however, promised more than the G-20 could realistically deliver. As a result, the policy 
guidance for enhancing financial stability remains unsettled – and arguably deficient in terms of 
addressing the specific needs of emerging markets and nonbank activities. 
 
In particular, the new G-20-centered framework’s goal of providing more balance among developing, 
emerging-market, and advanced economies in shaping common global financial policies has not yet been 
fully realised. On the positive side, the membership of key bodies such as the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), or Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS) has been significantly rebalanced to better represent Asian jurisdictions (as described below in the 
section on Cross-Border Integration). For reasons that involve both emerging-market and incumbent 
advanced economies, though, the influence of non-Western members of such bodies in their workings and 
outcomes is often less than the weight of those members’ formal representation – and that is the case at 
the FSB (Véron, 2014; Walter, 2015). 
 
In the absence of a generally accepted framework for financial stability, policymakers in developing Asia 
need to exercise judgment while determining which choices are best suited to their specific situation. The 
most important point is that there is no simple linear relationship between financial repression and 
stability – postponing or avoiding financial liberalisation not only has costs but so doing can itself 
undermine systemic stability in developing economies. That fact holds, even though it is undeniable that 
Anglo-American light-touch financial regulation and supervision were destabilising and warn us to avoid 
extreme deregulation. We offer the following guidelines for policymakers pursuing financial stability in 
developing Asia: 
 
• Bank-based or bank-centric financial systems are not inherently safer than systems that include 
meaningful roles for securities and capital markets. 
• Domestic financial systems should be steadily diversified in terms of both number of domestic 
competitors and types of saving and lending instruments available (and thus probably types of 
institutions). 
• Financial repression should be focused on regulating the activities of financial intermediaries and 
investment managers/funds, not on compressing interest rates and returns for domestic savers. 
• Cross-border lending from regional financial centres in foreign currency should be in limited 
quantities only for top companies, but creation of multinational banks’ subsidiaries in the local 
economy – and local currency lending and bond issuance – should be encouraged. 
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• Macroprudential tools can be useful and, if anything, are more effective in less open or less 
financially deep economies than in more advanced financial entrepots, but they must be used 
aggressively when needed and are particularly suited for dealing with real estate booms/busts. 
 
The next four sections develop these ideas in more detail for banking, nonbank finance, macroprudential 
policy, and cross-border issues. This paper aims at supporting Asian policymakers’ judgment by providing 
policy views and recommendations that are based on our analysis of the recent sequence of events in the 
United States and Europe and of earlier crisis episodes, including those in Asia (including Japan) during 
the 1990s. The last section synthesises the commonalities between developing Asia and some of these 
advanced-economy crises. 
 
BANKING POLICY 
 
Banks are the backbone of the financial system in most developing Asian countries and will remain so for 
the foreseeable future. Thus, banking policy will remain fundamental to shaping the financial system and 
ensuring financial stability. 
 
In almost all cases, this policy should aim at fostering market mechanisms in the functioning of the 
banking system, especially the setting of interest rates for saving and borrowing and competition among 
banks. It is natural for governments everywhere to be tempted to distort the functioning of the financial 
system to facilitate the financing of their own operations or of specific economic activities or agents that 
they favour, a stance that the economic jargon loosely refers to as ‘financial repression’. But this temptation 
of financial repression should be resisted in most circumstances, except during wars or other acute and 
temporary national emergencies. Specifically, the compression of interest rates offered to savers through 
a combination of capital controls and constraints on domestic banks – a common form of financial 
repression – is typically destabilising, because it encourages savers to find their way around the interest 
rate caps with harmful unintended consequences. The PRC over the past decade offers a relevant 
illustration of this mechanism, in which the repression of savings has encouraged both unproductive 
overinvestment and the build-up of financial risk in the “shadow banking” sector (Lardy, 2014). 
 
Financial repression also exists under different forms in advanced countries, and its track record there is 
no more compelling than in less wealthy countries. The experience of the European Union offers a 
cautionary tale. Many EU member states entered the crisis of the late 2000s with a legacy of policies that 
included: 
 
• Significant levels of public ownership of banks (at the national or local government level); 
• Other levers of government influence to direct lending, such as tax loopholes and tweaks in 
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regulatory requirements, eg the now notorious practice of assigning a zero risk-weight to all EU 
sovereign debt; 
• Sector-specific accounting, auditing, and disclosure frameworks and practices; 
• Curbs on nonbank finance, eg the prohibition of activities such as leasing and factoring without a 
banking license, which enhanced the dominance of banking intermediation; and 
• Selective or complacent enforcement of competition policy in the banking sector. 
 
The detail of these cases of “financial repression with European characteristics” varied across EU countries. 
Overall, they significantly contributed to the systemic banking fragility that has been plaguing European 
growth since the initial shock of 2007-08. 
 
The need for competition and market-based price setting and credit allocation, however, should not offset 
the equally important need for proper bank regulation. Banks are inherently leveraged institutions, and, 
because they collect deposits, are repositories of trust in society. In addition, the services they provide are 
rife with asymmetries of information, which no amount of public financial education can adequately check. 
As a consequence, the regulation and supervision of banks by public authorities is a vital condition for 
financial stability and efficient financing of the economy. 
 
The public-interest nature of depository institutions is one of the reasons why many countries have 
brought significant swaths of their banking system under public ownership. This is by no means unique to 
Asia. As mentioned above, Europe is a case in point. To give only a few examples among advanced 
economies, Italy nationalised many banks in the 1930s, and France in the 1940s, even though most of 
these were privatised in the 1990s. At present, more than a third of Germany’s banking system is still in 
public hands. Even in the United States, the federal government guaranteed the two large US mortgage 
companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, before the crisis and now owns them as well. More often than not, 
however, the benefits of public bank ownership in terms of anchoring trust are offset by the challenges it 
creates in terms of poor corporate governance, politicised lending, interference of trade unions in 
management (in some countries), and other flaws that typically result in inferior risk management. Thus, 
those developing Asian countries that have reached a level of development that supports functioning 
large-scale private sector organisations should favour private over public ownership of their banking 
system (Figure 1). 
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Nevertheless, again because of the same public-interest aspect of deposit taking and other features of 
banking, the operations of private sector banks should be ring-fenced from other forms of private sector 
activity. The principle known in the United States as “separation of banking and commerce”, according to 
which banking and nonfinancial activities should not coexist within the same commercial entity, has 
gradually emerged as a response to the frequent abuses of bank-industry links, typically in the form of 
preferential financing by banks of related business operations against the interest of their other claimants, 
including depositors. 
 
In developing and emerging-market economies, however, the separation between banking and commerce 
is often porous to non-existent. In many such countries, established families or groups with multiple 
business interests are the only non-state stakeholders that can provide the necessary financial and 
reputational capital to establish successful banks. This arguably justifies the recent initiatives in both the 
PRC and India to grant new bank licenses to existing corporate groups to check state-owned banking 
behemoths. 
 
Even in advanced economies, the separation is seldom absolute. For example, several European 
automotive manufacturers have large credit-financing arms that are considered banks under EU legislation 
(even though they do not collect deposits), and in the United States, automakers and industrial equipment 
suppliers like GE had long maintained a sizeable quasi-bank financial arm. Policymakers in developing 
Asia, however, should remain acutely aware of the vast potential for conflicts of interest that exists when a 
bank is part of a broader commercial or industrial group. This is also true in the context of new internet-
based financial services, which are often ‘bundled’ with non-financial commercial offerings. While such 
bundling may represent an attractive and efficient proposition for consumers, it should be subject to 
adequate supervision. 
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A separate policy debate refers to the possible separation, within financial groups, of different types of 
financial activities and particularly of commercial and investment banking. In the United States, the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1934 introduced such a stark separation, which was repealed in 1999, arguably to ill effect. 
Similarly in the United Kingdom, merchant banks were kept separate from commercial banks until the 
deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s. Similar provisions have existed or still exist in several Asian 
countries such as the PRC, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. For example, in the PRC, banks are 
prohibited from equities brokerage, which is the sole preserve of securities firms under a separate 
regulator. Following the recent financial crisis, the public anger against bailouts of large banks has led to 
the introduction or reintroduction of legal constraints on the structure of banking groups in the United 
States and Europe. These include the Volcker rule, which aims at prohibiting proprietary trading by banks in 
the United States; the Vickers reform in the United Kingdom, which mandates the ring-fencing of retail and 
commercial banking operations from other financial services; and EU legislation on banking structural 
reform, which, however, is still under discussion at the time of writing. 
 
While mantras such as “banks should not be allowed to speculate with household deposits” resonate with 
politicians and the general public, however, a more in-depth analysis suggests caution against simplistic 
solutions of separation. The legal definition of ‘speculation’ as opposed to hedging or market-making has 
proved elusive, and the highly complex implementation of the Volcker rule does not appear to satisfy its 
initial promoters more than its critics. Similarly, the spread of credit-transfer techniques such as derivatives 
has irreversibly blurred the boundary between commercial and wholesale banking, and it is not evident 
that the distinction has much substance from a systemic risk perspective. 
 
That said, some principles of separation appear necessary and healthy. Insurance operations in a broader 
financial group should be conducted in a separate subsidiary with its own capital. Asset management 
activities also require separation, in order to ensure that funds under a bank’s custody are not confused 
with those under the bank’s direct ownership. Furthermore, some structural measures may be necessary 
to ensure or facilitate a bank’s resolution in the event of failure (see below on resolution). But these may 
be better left to the judgment of supervisors, and thus tailored to the specific situation of each banking 
group, than defined uniformly in legislation. 
 
For bank capital regulation, the Basel III capital accord, first defined in 2010 and continuously refined since, 
provides a global framework of reference. The BCBS has initiated reviews of individual jurisdictions’ 
compliance with Basel III in terms of laws and regulations (leaving aside the question of how these are 
implemented and enforced), dubbed the Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP). Asian 
jurisdictions whose RCAP reviews have been published so far – Japan in October 2012, Singapore in March 
2013, the PRC in September 2013, Hong Kong, China in March 2015, and India in June 2015 – have all 
been deemed ‘compliant’, the best grading in the RCAP process. This is in contrast with both the United 
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States and European Union, which have been found, respectively, ‘largely compliant’ and ‘materially 
noncompliant’ in their RCAP reports, both published in December 2014. Other Asian jurisdictions that will 
be reviewed under RCAP in the near future include the Republic of Korea (June 2016) and Indonesia 
(September 2016)3. No equivalent assessment is available at this point for developing Asian jurisdictions 
that are not BCBS members. 
 
The Basel III framework has occasionally been criticised for being ill suited for developing or emerging-
market economies and for excessively constraining, for example, bank lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The Basel calibrations, however, have taken into account observations from across the 
BCBS membership, including emerging-market economies. The critique of the impact on SME lending has 
been acute in Europe as well, leading to deviations from Basel III in setting capital charges for loans to SMEs 
in the legislation that transposes Basel III into EU law, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). 
This is a significant reason for the low grading of the European Union under RCAP as materially 
noncompliant. In reality, lending to SMEs is inherently risky and the artificial reduction of the corresponding 
capital charges, as in CRR, represents a questionable distortion of the prudential framework. 
 
In any case, the Basel framework is intended only for larger internationally active banks. In general, 
developing Asian countries should aim at such large banks’ compliance with Basel III while engaging 
actively with the BCBS standard-setting process in order to ensure that it fairly takes into account the 
realities of all jurisdictions. The Basel III standards on bank capital and leverage, and the complementary 
standards from the FSB on additional requirements on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements currently under discussion, are based on long-
standing experience with capital requirements. Many aspects remain hotly debated, including the 
principle of measuring capital ratios against risk-weighted assets; nevertheless, the framework can in 
general terms be considered tried and tested, and broadly balanced. 
 
By contrast, the parts of Basel III that deal with liquidity issues are more experimental in nature and subject 
to more uncertainty as to their possible unintended consequences. These include the liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR), aimed at ensuring resilience against a temporary liquidity shock, and the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR), aimed at ensuring ongoing sustainability of a bank’s funding structure. The LCR is still in a 
period of phasing-in that will be completed only in early 2019 (BCBS, 2013). The definition of the NSFR was 
finalised only in October 2014, and its introduction is planned for early 2018 (BCBS, 2014). Countries in 
developing Asia, especially those that are not BCBS members, have no need to rush into implementation 
of these measures and may gain from observing their early implementation in other jurisdictions. 
 
For all its importance, regulation is only one part of the banking policy framework and must be 
                                                          
3 BCBS website, www.bis.org/bcbs (accessed on 6 August 2015). 
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complemented with effective arrangements for supervision and crisis management. In spite of some 
improvement, bank supervision capacity remains constrained in many developing Asian countries. To be 
effective, supervision must be based on an in-depth analysis of risk in the banks’ balance sheets and their 
environment and not just on the formulaic application of prudential ratios. Capacity constraints make it 
particularly important to complement supervision with an effective framework for market discipline, based 
on strong standards for accounting, auditing, and supervisory disclosures (the so-called third pillar of the 
Basel framework). Similarly, stress testing has emerged as an increasingly prominent component of the 
supervisory toolkit (Goldstein 2015) but also requires the build-up of adequate capacity. 
 
Resolution frameworks are an even more challenging issue for many developing and emerging-market 
economies, including those in Asia. The familiar trade-off, when a bank faces severe difficulties, is between 
bailing out all creditors, at the risk of a severe fiscal burden and erosion of market discipline in the rest of 
the banking system, and “bail-in” (the imposition of losses on creditors and, if necessary to plug the capital 
gap, on some depositors), at the risk of contagion to other banks and a larger eventual financial and 
economic cost. The case of Kazakhstan’s BTA Bank in February 2009 shows that such contagion can be 
managed in some cases, at least in countries with a strong fiscal position4. Ideally, an orderly resolution 
system makes it possible to distribute losses to private sector stakeholders in a manner that does not 
undermine systemic trust. The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) track record of resolving 
small and medium-sized depository institutions offers the most prominent model for this. It is now being 
emulated in the European Union with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) of 2014 and in 
the euro area with the establishment of a Single Resolution Board to handle future bank crises. 
 
A predictable resolution system, however, involves a lot of prerequisites in terms of the rule of law, 
functioning court system (because the resolution process is always defined with reference to the 
alternative of court-ordered insolvency), and the administrative capacity of the resolution authority itself. 
Even in the United States, the operation of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in the case of future crises involving 
systemically important financial institutions remains entirely to be tested. As a consequence, developing 
Asian countries should put emphasis on crisis prevention rather than resolution and carefully observe 
developments in other jurisdictions to optimise their capacity to respond to future banking crises. 
 
The creation of a credible system for deposit insurance is another component of bank crisis management 
frameworks. The specific features of deposit insurance schemes are important to ensure effectiveness, 
and poorly designed systems can be detrimental rather than beneficial to financial stability (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2000). But if properly set up and funded, a deposit insurance framework can have 
an important stabilising effect by reducing the disruption associated with retail bank runs. Here again, the 
                                                          
4 ‘Restructuring banks: don’t start from here – Kazakhstan shows it is possible to make banks’ creditors share the 
pain’, The Economist, 25 November 2010, www.economist.com/node/17583123 (accessed on 7 August 2015). 
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build-up of adequate capacity and credibility is crucial to the effectiveness of the policy framework. 
 
A proper competition policy is also important in the banking sector, which is prone to concentration of 
market power in a limited number of dominant banks that benefit from an implicit ‘too big to fail’ guarantee. 
Local credit unions, cooperatives, and micro-lending institutions often play a vital role in financing small 
businesses and job creation in developing economies as in advanced ones. Public authorities should 
ensure that the environment does not prevent their development, while simultaneously refraining from 
giving them special competitive privileges.  
 
In banking as in other economic sectors, new technology is disrupting the competitive landscape, fostering 
both new risks and new opportunities. The massive spread of computing power and mobile service 
accessibility, combined with increasingly large mobilisation of venture capital for ‘fin-tech’ (financial 
technology) start-up enterprises, is likely to significantly change the way financial services are offered and 
delivered in the next few years. The M-Pesa money transfer service, pioneered by Vodafone in Kenya and 
Tanzania since 2007 and now used in a growing number of other countries, and the Alipay payment 
platform, launched by Alibaba in the PRC in 2004 and complemented by a highly successful online savings 
offering (Yu’e Bao) since 2013, are illustrations of the transformative power of mobile finance. Better use 
of technology also holds vast potential to combat corruption, money laundering, and the financing of 
terrorism across borders, in spite of numerous practical and political obstacles. 
 
Because developing countries in Asia and other regions are less encumbered with legacy systems, they 
can often adopt such new technologies quickly and can thus ‘leapfrog’ services or practices that are more 
widespread in advanced economies but are rapidly becoming obsolete. Technology-enabled access to 
financial services, including on a cross-border basis, may increase the cost of financial repression and 
reduce its effectiveness. The disruption of finance by these technologies has barely started, and it is not 
possible at this early stage to predict its future intensity and the exact challenges it will entail. What is 
already clear, however, is that public authorities in developing Asia and elsewhere need to devote 
appropriate resources to monitor financial technology developments in real time and understand what 
these developments mean for them. 
 
NONBANK FINANCE 
 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 memorably led the then chairman of the US Federal Reserve to 
observe: “Before the crisis broke, there was little reason to question the three decades of phenomenally 
solid East Asian economic growth, largely financed through the banking system. The rapidly expanding 
economies and bank credit growth kept the ratio of nonperforming loans to total bank assets low. The failure 
to have backup forms of intermediation was of little consequence. The lack of a spare tire is of no concern 
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if you do not get a flat. East Asia had no spare tires”5. Since then, countries in developing Asia and 
elsewhere have endeavoured to develop bond markets and local-currency issuance (Goswani and 
Sharma, 2011). In the PRC, some diversification away from a purely bank-dominated system has been 
achieved through the toleration by public authorities of the rapid development of “shadow” finance (Borst 
and Lardy, 2015). The concern to develop nonbank finance is by no means limited to Asia. In the European 
Union, the European Commission has similarly announced an agenda of ‘capital markets union’, even 
though its exact content has not yet been determined (European Commission, 2015). 
 
The development of nonbank finance has a two-pronged rationale. First, the ‘spare tyre’ argument holds that 
alternative financing channels can take the baton of credit provision when banks need to deleverage and 
restructure themselves, which typically happens after a systemic crisis. Furthermore, capital markets, 
particularly their equity component, provide a powerful mechanism for risk sharing across regions 
(Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha, 1996; IMF, 2013). As in natural ecosystems, diversity of the financial 
system is a factor of resilience and stability. Second, capital markets and the nonbank sector offer forms of 
financing that are better suited than bank lending to support specific patterns of development, especially 
service innovators and other high-growth companies that do not have tangible assets to pledge as collateral 
(Philippon and Véro,n 2008). Thus, the development of nonbank finance enhances the economy’s growth 
potential and counts as a form of structural reform. 
 
These arguments are generally compelling when applied to advanced economies such as the European 
Union (Véron and Wolff, 2015; Langfield and Pagano, 2015). In developing economies, their relevance has 
to be assessed against each country’s specific context. Even well-developed local-currency bond markets 
primarily benefit larger companies. Corporate loan securitisation is unsuited to lending to small 
companies, because the costs associated with the required documentation and corresponding corporate 
transparency are prohibitively high: Even in the world’s most developed securitisation market, the United 
States, the volumes of SME loan securitisation are low. Thus, countries where SMEs carry out most of the 
business activity will struggle to establish vibrant national capital markets. These countries might benefit 
more from opening up to cross-border capital flows to favour external – but not necessarily foreign 
currency – financing of their highest-potential companies through foreign intermediaries rather than 
domestic ones (see section on Cross-Border Integration). 
 
The development of the Chinese shadow banking sector also offers an important reference point for 
developing Asia. Given the sector’s generally insufficient transparency, it is difficult at the time of writing to 
form firm opinions about its medium-term economic impact. There are widely different assessments about 
                                                          
5 Alan Greenspan (1999) ‘Do efficient financial markets mitigate financial crises?’ Remarks at the Financial Markets 
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, GA, 19 October, 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991019.htm (accessed on 7 August 2015). 
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the risk it represents for overall systemic stability. Nevertheless, the authorities appear to have reached 
the conclusion that, even if it does put competitive pressure on the incumbent banks, the shadow banking 
system cannot be allowed to grow unchecked. The lack of data makes it difficult to evaluate the contribution 
of the PRC’s shadow banking system to nonfinancial corporate financing at this point, but in any case, it is 
unlikely to grow as dynamically as it has in the last few years. Furthermore, the unique size of the PRC 
economy and internal market means that its experience cannot be directly replicated in other countries of 
developing Asia. 
 
Dynamic capital markets and nonbank finance can be very beneficial to the economy if they function 
properly, as the example of the United States illustrates. But to function properly, they have to meet a 
number of conditions. In particular, insolvency and debt restructuring frameworks are essential 
components of the intangible infrastructure that supports them. In countries where insolvency processes 
are either inefficient or easily hijacked by special interests or both, riskier forms of nonbank credit (such 
as high-yield bonds, securitisation or mezzanine credit) are likely to be difficult to introduce, because of 
the lack of underlying trust that creditors’ interests will be suitably defended in case the supported venture 
is not successful. 
 
Similarly, equity markets and several segments of nonbank credit markets require a high standard of 
corporate governance and financial transparency to function properly. Many developing Asian economies 
have made progress toward accounting transparency by adopting International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), which generally represent an improvement on pre-existing national standards in terms 
of the quality of financial statements. As of mid-2014 this was the case in Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Maldives; Mongolia; Nepal; Singapore; and Taipei, 
China, among others. Furthermore Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan are using 
standards that differ from IFRS only on a limited number of points, while the PRC, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
and Thailand have for the moment retained national accounting standards even though these are partly 
modelled on the IFRS (Pacter, 2015). In any event, accounting standards are only one part of a robust 
corporate financial reporting framework. Equally important are the requirements and practices that govern 
auditing and the enforcement of accounting standards by public authorities (generally securities markets 
regulators). On both these dimensions, and despite the near total absence of reliable comparative data, it 
appears that most developing Asian countries have significant potential for progress. 
 
Financial ecosystems change only slowly. In their ambition to foster financial development and 
particularly the expansion of nonbank finance, policymakers in developing Asia should resist the 
temptation to artificially accelerate the financial evolutionary process by subsidising market segments 
that they see as desirable or granting them special tax or regulatory privileges. This is particularly true in 
the area of venture capital (VC), a segment that many governments in developing, emerging-market, and 
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advanced economies alike view as disproportionately beneficial to the economy because it is associated 
with innovative, high-growth firms, including disruptive technological innovators. 
 
In Europe, for example, a number of governments have intervened directly in the VC market, by setting up 
public funds that either invest in private sector VC funds or invest directly in companies, alone or in co-
investment with private sector VC funds. Many such funds exist in Europe at the subnational, national, and 
European levels (the European Investment Fund is managed by the European Investment Bank). Generally 
speaking, the track record of these funds is poor, and there is even evidence that they represent a drag 
rather than a stimulant for the growth of a healthy VC sector (Veugelers, 2011). It appears that the stringent 
control mechanisms that are inherent in the deployment of public money are incompatible with the high-
risk, high-failure-rate, judgment-based approach that defines VC investment. Developing Asian countries 
should learn from the European failures in this area. Rather than throwing scarce public money at the 
sector, they should focus on the environment that shapes VC activity, including the quality of higher 
education, predictability of tax and regulatory developments, protection of intellectual property rights, 
openness to foreign investment, and integrity of the justice system. 
 
All things considered, the potential for nonbank finance in developing Asia depends heavily on each 
country’s specific context of financial, economic, and institutional development. For some, a home-grown 
nonbank financial sector with critical mass can provide benefits in terms of both higher growth potential and 
higher stability; for other countries, it is more promising to become more open to financing from outside by 
pursuing cross-border financial integration (see section on Cross-Border Integration). Banks will continue to 
play an irreplaceable role in the financing of the economy in all Asian countries. 
 
MACROPRUDENTIAL TOOLS AND THEIR USE 
 
Macroprudential policy concepts have evolved gradually since the 1970s from the realisation that the 
regulation and supervision of individual financial firms may not always be sufficient to ensure the stability 
of the financial system as a whole (Borio, 2003; Clement, 2010). The corresponding instruments include, 
in particular, loan-to-value (LTV) limits, countercyclical capital buffers and time-varying reserve 
requirements, and targeted taxes and levies on financial activities. The existence of a track record varies 
depending on the instrument: Some measures have been used long before being given a ‘macroprudential’ 
label, the use of which has become significantly more widespread over the last decade; others are largely 
or entirely untested. 
 
The dataset of past macroprudential actions assembled by Longmei Zhang and Edda Zoli (2014) suggests 
that Asian countries have a higher propensity to engage in such measures than jurisdictions in other 
regions (Figure 2). This dataset establishes a distinction between macroprudential policies and capital flow 
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management (CFM) measures, which are occasionally associated with a macroprudential objective. The 
same source identifies a marked increase in CFM measures in Asia following the peak of the financial crisis 
in late 2008 but at a pace that is far lower than that of the Latin American region, which leads in this 
category. 
 
Macroprudential measures, of course, distort the operation of market mechanisms and in principle should 
be introduced only in response to a specifically identified market failure. The absence of relevant general 
equilibrium economic models of financial systems, however, implies that there is a strong heuristic 
element in the elaboration of such measures, which itself is made more challenging by the difficulty of 
assessing their effectiveness in terms of both benefits and costs (Claessens, 2014). 
 
The area in which macroprudential measures appear to have had the most compelling record of 
effectiveness is in real estate booms and busts. Such booms and busts are one of the major drivers of 
systemic financial crises, as illustrated in recent years by the United States but also by several European 
countries including Ireland, Spain, and the Baltic countries. Developing Asian countries should introduce 
macroprudential tools to dampen property booms, or maintain and refine them if they already have 
(Jeanne 2014). Beyond this sector-specific aspect, there is a case for being cautious – developing status 
and absence of a globalised financial centre in this instance can be a virtue, as most asset price booms 
with systemic implications will be confined largely to real estate (whether commercial or residential). 
 
In any event, it is important for all Asian countries, as in the rest of the world, to devote resources to better 
monitor and understand developments in their financial system beyond the banking sector. These include 
the timely collection and publication of statistics. For these, Asian countries should seek compliance with 
international standards and practices as developed by the BIS Irving Fisher Committee and the work 
developed since 2008 under the aegis of the G-20 to address ‘data gaps’ (FSB and IMF, 2014). 
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CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION 
 
Financial stability frameworks are not purely domestic, since cross-border financial integration affects all 
countries at least to a certain extent. The impact of such integration on stability, however, is ambiguous and 
easy to misunderstand. Generally speaking, the judgment of national authorities is inherently skewed in 
this area, as they tend to view and treat home-grown risks that arise under their watch more leniently than 
risks coming from abroad. A quintessential example of this bias was offered by European prudential 
authorities in the first few years of the recent financial crisis, which they blamed on the United States 
without an in-depth examination of why European banks had ended up with an aggregate exposure to the 
US subprime market risk that was equal to if not larger than that of American banks (IMF, 2009). It took an 
unjustifiably long time for these authorities to finally admit that faulty risk management systems and 
inadequate incentives, not just cross-border financial integration, had played an essential part in the 
corresponding build-up of risk in European banks’ balance sheets and that these could and should be 
addressed through domestic initiatives (Posen and Véron, 2009). 
 
Depending on circumstances, cross-border financial integration can be a source of financial resilience or 
of financial fragility. For example, the presence of foreign banks can have a powerful stabilising effect in a 
domestic crisis. A classic example of this was the housing market downturn in the three Baltic countries of 
the European Union (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) in 2008-09. Following large-scale privatisations in the 
1990s and early 2000s, most banks in these countries were owned by foreign financial institutions from 
Sweden and Norway. These banks were able to absorb the losses associated with the downturn without 
suffocating the local economies through a massive credit crunch, an outcome that would most probably 
not have been achieved if the banking sector had been domestically owned. This factor played a significant 
role in the rapid rebound of growth in these countries after a severe downturn and fiscal adjustment. More 
generally, in central and eastern Europe, the large presence of foreign (mostly western European) banks, 
which in several countries of the region represent more than half of total banking assets, helped absorb 
the initial shock of the crisis in 2008-09. It became a potential drag, however, when several of these banks, 
for example, those headquartered in Spain and Italy, were forced to reduce their exposures to the region 
because of problems in their home countries. 
 
In this context, developing Asian countries should take a pragmatic and open approach to cross- border 
lending and cross-border bank ownership. The presence of foreign banks can provide significant and 
welcome competitive pressure, forcing domestic banks to improve their efficiency and to offer better-
quality services, even if domestically headquartered banks retain the largest share of the local banking 
market, as is the case in most Asian jurisdictions. Similarly, the offshoring by domestic banks of some of 
their activities to regional or global financial centres, especially in wholesale market activities such as 
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derivatives trading and asset management, can be a good thing for the local economy if it enables these 
banks to offer better-priced services based on those financial centres’ critical size and depth. Most 
developing Asian countries should try to leverage the strength of existing regional financial centres, 
primarily Singapore and Hong Kong, China, rather than trying to create international financial centres of 
their own – a seductive objective for many developing countries but that more often than not results in 
costly failure to reach critical mass and attract international market participants. 
 
In Asia, financial integration lags compared with economic integration more broadly, and the level of 
financial integration is typically higher with non-Asian countries than inside the region (Kim and Lee, 2008; 
Borensztein and Loungani, 2011; Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster, 2011). This suggests a significant 
scope for allowing more cross-border financial services and investment without creating a risk to financial 
stability. Developing Asian countries might consider measures such as the reduction of tax and regulatory 
distortions between domestic and foreign banks and investors as well as adopt an open-minded approach 
to inward mergers and acquisitions in the banking and financial sector. 
 
Developing Asia would also gain from a common institutional framework to level the playing field and 
ensure convergence in financial standards and practice. Realistically, the ambition should stop short of a 
seamlessly integrated single market in financial services. The experience in the European Union suggests 
that such ‘deep’ financial integration can lead to destabilising incentives for national authorities when it is 
not accompanied by a strong supranational supervisory and regulatory function, which is eventually being 
created in Europe (in particular with the euro area’s banking union) but is not realistic in the Asian context 
(Dobson, 2011). 
 
Specifically, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) endorsed a regional Banking Integration 
Framework in 2011 and is working on implementing it at a differentiated pace among its members. Unlike 
the European banking union, this development is unlikely to alter the ASEAN countries’ fundamental 
reliance on national policy frameworks for banking sector soundness and financial stability (Wihardja, 
2013). Rather than emulating European banking integration, Asian countries could build on the existing 
institutional framework at the international level. International financial institutions have markedly 
improved the representation of Asian jurisdictions in their membership and decision- making bodies since 
the start of the financial crisis, mostly through a reduction (but not elimination) of the prior 
overrepresentation of European countries (Figure 3). 
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This recent rebalancing, however, is not yet sufficient to ensure adequate “ownership” of these global 
institutions by Asian policymakers and public opinions. While the membership of the global bodies has 
evolved, their leadership remains heavily skewed toward nationals from the United States, Europe, Canada, 
and Australia (Véron, 2014). Furthermore, their location in Europe and the United States creates an 
imbalance that makes it more difficult for Asians to engage, in terms of distance and time zones. The 
relocation of at least some of the existing institutions to Asia, as well as the establishment in Asia of any 
newly formed global financial regulatory organisation, would improve the prospects for a more balanced 
system6. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Asian policymakers are right to put financial stability at the top of their agendas, right to question whether 
Anglo-American turbo-charged financial liberalisation really serves development, and right to doubt that 
the measures undertaken by the FSB and G-20 will provide their economies with adequate or targeted 
buffers. The questioning, however, should not go so far as to result in an excessive distrust of financial 
liberalisation. The path to financial stability has more similarity across levels of development than may first 
appear. Upon closer examination, it quickly becomes clear that similar sorts of crises arise at all levels of 
                                                          
6 Nicolas Véron (2012) ‘Move the Financial Stability Board’s Secretariat to Asia’, RealTime Economic Issues Watch, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 10 May, http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=2871 (accessed on 7 
August 2015). 
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financial development – the parallels between the Asian crises of 1997-98 and the US/UK (2007-10) and 
euro-area (2007-15) crises are quite evident. If anything, the Americans and Europeans would likely have 
done better in responding to their crises had they adhered to the recommendations they made to Asia a 
decade earlier (Rhee and Posen, 2013). Of course, financial stability and development are more than 
matters of crisis response, so the common threads are a little less obvious than avoiding throwing good 
money after bad and injecting capital where necessary. 
 
We believe the most important parallel with respect to financial stability between the recent advanced 
economies’ experience and the challenges facing Asian policymakers is the repeated failure of financial 
repression to provide stability. Across southern Europe even in recent years, and earlier in the American 
‘heartland’ and among the mid-sized banks in Japan, various forms of financial repression bottling up 
household savings in protected financial institutions were widespread – and instability still befell these 
economies. While the recent North Atlantic financial developments were importantly worsened by too big 
to fail distortions, in Europe in the 2010s, like in Japan in the 1990s and the United States in the 1980s, 
most of the problems were generated in and on the balance sheets of government-guaranteed smaller 
financial institutions (Goldstein and Véron, 2011; Mikitani and Posen, 2001). Similarly, cross- border capital 
flows also played a huge part in the build-up of unsustainable lending – be it in Greece or Nevada, Ireland 
or Florida – but those destabilising inflows took place across a wide variety of exchange rate regimes, 
levels of development, and even domestic financial institutions. 
 
Because there is no simple positive correlation between financial liberalisation and instability, the optimal 
policy approach is not about achieving a lukewarm compromise between repression and liberalisation. We 
have offered a few specific suggestions for Asian policymakers about how to implement a balanced 
strategy in practice. These general principles can be followed at most stages of economic and financial 
development and are not complicated matters of sequencing or conditionality depending upon what form 
development has taken to date. 
 
This wide applicability comes from the fact that financial stability ultimately stems from having adequately 
varied sources of commercial credit and outlets for household savings, so that fragility – or even 
mismanagement or supervisory capture – of one piece of the system does not bring down the economy’s 
whole framework. The greater depth and diversity of the US financial system versus the UK concentrated 
banking development meant the former contributed to a much better and more rapid recovery from crisis 
than was seen in the latter7. A similar argument could be made for Singapore versus some other smaller East 
Asian economies in 1997-98, or the resilience of Japan in 2008 versus 1988. Capital markets and local 
                                                          
7 Adam Posen (2012) ‘Why is their recovery better than ours? (Even though neither is good enough)’, speech at the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, 27 March, 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/ speeches/2012/speech560.pdf (accessed on 7 August 
2015). 
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lenders are both good things to have. 
 
Thus, our foremost recommendation is that Asian policymakers should promote diversity in domestic 
financial institutions, which is generally a factor of resilience and stability. This calls for diversification of 
national financial systems away from the dominance of banks and for openness to cross-border (though 
not necessarily foreign-currency) financial services and intermediaries. This is indeed a call for continued 
financial liberalisation where needed but not for laissez-faire supervision or the ongoing diminution of 
traditional banking or importation of all the latest financial innovations. The issue is one of institutional 
structures within the financial sector8. We repeat that diversity is also a call for multiple financial 
institutions within any given (sub-) sector – that is, for number not just type. While the many examples 
cited indicate that problems can arise in protected small institutions like Spanish savings banks (cajas) or 
US savings and loans, that is simply a caution not to assume size is everything or that more players are 
always better. We fully endorse the idea that every developing economy should have more than one major 
bank or financial institution, even if a foreign-owned one, given all the political economy problems that too 
big to fail entails, and that there is no development advantage to promoting a financial ‘national champion’ 
– what matters is the resilience of provision of financial services to the economy, which is better served by 
multiple players in type and number9. 
 
Second, we recommend that financial repression be limited to those measures that can be equally 
characterised as strong prudential regulation – that put the focus on financial sector activities, the most 
destabilising of which can be identified and restricted. So doing takes away the focus on restricting the 
location and investment vehicles of household savers. Bad financial repression of the sort focused on 
bottling up savings to subsidise lending is actually destabilising for economies at all levels of 
development. Interest rate compression will lead to increasingly frantic efforts by savers to get around 
limits and even border controls, which will result in speculative bursts in limited asset classes to 
potentially great harm. Arguably, this is the source of the market instability and the real estate downturn in 
the PRC in 2015. 
 
Low interest rates or a large gap between what savers get and borrowers pay from what the market rate 
would be are not only an inefficient, often politicised, way to allocate resources but also contrary to 
                                                          
8 This statement is based solely on financial stability considerations. There is a historical and plausible economic 
argument that a Japan – Republic of Korea – Taipei, China bank-centric model fosters helpful industrial policy 
through a state-dominated banking system insulated from the outside world. While we are sceptical of the virtues of 
this approach, also shown to have limits in Western Europe, we recognise that policymakers in developing Asia will 
have to take into account the desire to follow this model in trade-off with the financial stability benefits of a more 
open and diverse capital system. For a longer-term perspective on these developments, see Jeanne et al (2014). 
9 The pursuit of national champion banks even by global financial centres in an advanced economy is mistaken for 
the same reasons. See Adam Posen (2012) ‘It’s time the UK stopped “fetishizing” its banks’, remarks at the Just 
Banking Conference, Edinburgh, April 19, www.ianfraser.org/boes-adam-posen-at-the-just-banking-conference 
(accessed on 7 August 2015). 
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financial stability goals. Again, a sensible set of policies includes strong regulatory oversight of financial 
activities without having to resort to either full-on liberalisation or ongoing financial repression. 
 
Third, policymakers should carefully monitor the potential impact of the use of new information technology 
in finance in the next few years. While banks and other financial firms have not been subject to as much 
technology-based change as other sectors for the moment, such change is likely to become increasingly 
prominent as the potential of mobile services in finance is operationalised. The development of a data-
centric culture, together with enhanced public transparency about financial firms and systems in 
compliance with international data standards, can help prepare for future disruptions. This is a situation 
where diversity and entry by new players can rapidly be taken too far, and some consumer protection as 
well as supervision is called for. In this area as well, there is room to distinguish between leapfrogging past 
constraints via mobile and internet in terms of payment systems, including government disbursement, 
which should be encouraged, and allowing a free-for-all in internet-driven trading and investment offers, 
which should not. 
 
Asian policymakers need to develop an information and supervisory infrastructure that keeps pace with 
development – something that actually is feasible, so long as best practices can be imported and advised 
and so long as the presumption is ‘allow but only within the tent’. Similar to the old saying ‘trust but verify’, 
this means that policymakers concerned about financial stability can indicate that they are always open 
to new products and providers, but only so long as those new offers are under some form of disclosure, 
monitoring, and clear accountability for losses. 
 
Less financially developed economies whose policymakers eschew financial fads and national champion 
banks can actually benefit from not having to be at the innovative cutting edge. There is little cost to the 
economy from using blunter tools than sometimes are available in the most advanced markets and from 
requiring all financial sector–like developments to be centrally monitored. Disputes over the cost of 
regulating financial innovation, and the risks that go with excessive game playing, can be left to the handful 
of global financial centres – so long as the policymaker of developing Asia is committed to ongoing relative 
innovation, that is bringing the domestic financial sector along toward the frontier of deepening markets. A 
similar argument is valid for the use of macroprudential tools in terms of blunt instruments to temper large 
sustained asset price swings: So long as the underlying and general commitment is to market-determined 
asset prices, financial and monetary policymakers need not worry about the occasional use of 
overwhelming force to stem, say, real estate bubbles fuelled by foreign capital (as in fact a number of Asian 
authorities are rightly doing at the moment). In a less developed financial system, such tools should be 
more effective than in economies where financial innovation and globalisation shields some financial 
activities from macroprudential policies’ reach. That should give Asian policymakers the confidence to 
continue to pursue financial development, just not at breakneck speed.  
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